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REAFFIRMING THE RIGHT TO PRETRIAL ASSISTANCE: THE
SURPRISING LITTLE CASE OF FELLERS V. UNITED STATES
James J. Tomkovicz*
INTRODUCTION
During the 2003 Term, the Supreme Court decided three cases involving con-
fessions. Each raised intriguing constitutional questions regarding the methods em-
ployed to obtain incriminating admissions and the subsequent use of those admissions
to secure convictions. Two of the cases-United States v. PataneI and Missouri v.
Seibert2 - yielded controversial,3 highly-publicized opinions4 regarding the scope of
Miranda v. Arizona5 and its exclusionary doctrine. Patane and Seibert provide un-
ambiguous evidence that the Court is deeply divided over the meaning and breadth of
the Miranda doctrine.6 Neither case produced a majority opinion, and four Justices dis-
sented in each. Nonetheless, the legal doctrine generated by those decisions proves that
a bare Court majority is firmly committed to paring that landmark ruling to the bone.7
* Edward A. Howrey Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. I would like
to express my gratitude to Tom O'Brien and John Pantazis for outstanding and dedicated
research and editorial assistance during the preparation of this Article and to Christopher
Moseng and Michael Sarabia for helping to ensure the quality of the final product.
542 U.S. 630 (2004).
2 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
3 See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Postscript: Another Look at Patane and Seibert, the 2004
Miranda "Poisoned Fruit" Cases, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 97 (2004); Joelle Anne Moreno,
Faith-Based Miranda?: Why the New Missouri v. Seibert Police "Bad Faith" Test Is a Terrible
Idea, 47 ARIZ. L. REv. 395 (2005); Daniel S. Nooter, Is Missouri v. Seibert Practicable?:
Supreme Court Dances the "Two-Step" Around Miranda, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1093 (2005);
Stewart J. Weiss, Missouri v. Seibert: Two-Stepping Towards the Apocalypse, 95 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMNOLOGY 945 (2005).
4 An End Run Around Miranda, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at A30; Jan Crawford
Greenburg, Supreme Court Revisits Scope of Miranda Rights, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10, 2003, at
C16; Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear New Arguments About Meaning of Miranda, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2003, at A27; Linda Greenhouse, Tactic of Delayed Miranda Warning Is
Barred, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,2004, at A17; Jerry Markon, Police Tactic to Sidestep Miranda
Rights Rejected, WASH. POST, June 29, 2004, at Al.
5 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 Although the membership of the Court has changed--Chief Justice Roberts taking
Chief Justice Rehnquist's seat and Justice Alito assuming Justice O'Connor's place-it seems
virtually certain that the outcomes in Patane and Seibert would be identical today and that
the Court remains equally divided over the Miranda doctrine. Neither new Justice is at all
likely to be markedly more generous in interpreting that landmark than his predecessor.
7 In light of the affirmation of Miranda's constitutional basis in Dickerson v. United
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As currently construed, Miranda, which is a shadow of its original self and seems
destined to shrink further, offers exceedingly limited Fifth Amendment shelter against
conviction based on inculpatory admissions.
The instant Article is not about Patane, Seibert, or the steady evisceration of
Miranda-topics worthy of much attention.8 Instead, the focus here is on Fellers v.
United States,9 the third of the 2003 Term confessions cases. Fellers did not involve
the controversial Fifth Amendment scheme developed in Miranda and its progeny;
instead, it was rooted in the much less notorious Sixth Amendment doctrine of Massiah
v. United States.I0 The outcome of Fellers stands in dramatic contrast to those of
Patane and Seibert. Fellers yielded a terse, unanimous, uncontroversial,1" and scarcely
noticed opinion just one and a half months after the Court heard argument. 2 Moreover,
the opinion provided an unequivocal answer to a straightforward, substantive issue by
reiterating and applying the oft-recited, original Massiah standard, and then remanded
a much more complex exclusionary rule issue to the lower court. 3
I had two initial reactions to the Fellers opinion. The first was surprise that the
petitioner had prevailed, for I had assessed the chances of reversal as slim indeed. 4
My second reaction was astonishment at the remarkably unenlightening character
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), there was some doubt about whether Miranda would continue
to shrink, as it had for many years prior to Dickerson. It seemed possible that Dickerson
might have signaled an end to the erosion of Miranda and might even have initiated a resur-
gence of that beleaguered doctrine. James T. Pisciotta, Miranda Survives to Be Heard:
Dickerson v. United States, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 673 (2001); Mitch Reid, United States v.
Dickerson: Uncovering Miranda's Once Hidden and Esoteric Constitutionality, 38 Hous.
L. REv. 1343 (2001). The lower court's opinion in Patane was based on the premise that
Dickerson had given new life to the Miranda doctrine and had undermined some of the de-
cisions that had diminished its force. United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir.
2002), cert. granted, 538 U.S. 976 (2003).
8 For treatments of those topics, see, for example, WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA'S WANING
PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON (2001); Ronald J. Allen,
Miranda's Hollow Core, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 71 (2006); David Bosworth, United States v.
Patane: The Supreme Court's ContinuedAssault on Miranda, 56 MERCERL. REv. 1499 (2005).
9 540 U.S. 519 (2004).
30 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
" The sole law review piece I have discovered that gives any substantial attention to Fellers
is a student note. See Justin Bishop Grewell, Note, A Walk in the Constitutional Orchard:
Distinguishing Fruits of Fifth Amendment Right to Counselfrom Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel in Fellers v. United States, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725 (2005).
12 In contrast, oral argument in Patane and Seibert was held in early December 2003, but
the opinions were not issued until June 28, 2004, at the end of the Court's Term.
'1 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 524-25.
,4 My involvement in drafting an amicus curiae brief in Patane led to some discussion with
Fellers's counsel of the issues raised and the arguments that should be pursued. My feeling at
the time was that the Supreme Court would decide the case on the basis of the exclusionary
rule issue and would rule against Fellers. The seemingly elementary substantive Sixth Amendment
issue discussed in this Article hardly seemed worthy of the Court's time and attention.
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of the Court's ruling. At first glance, the opinion seemed patently insignificant. "5 It
was hardly surprising that such an apparently minor blip on the radar would create
no stir in legal circles and would receive precious little public attention.
My surprise was soon tempered by a colleague's somewhat cynical, yet realistic and
prophetic observation that Mr. Fellers's victory was limited and might well be very
short-lived. She thought it entirely possible that on remand the Eighth Circuit would
once again affirm his conviction, clearly rooting its conclusion this time in the exclu-
sionary rule doctrine of Oregon v. Elstad16 that it had adverted to in its initial opinion.'7
More importantly, reflection upon the Court's opinion has prompted me to reconsider
my assessment of Fellers's significance. I am now convinced that what the Court did
say provides vital insights into and has potentially important consequences for the scope
of the pretrial right to the assistance of counsel. I am also persuaded that both what
the Court said and what it did not say may have significant implications for an im-
portant topic that the Court has seriously neglected-Massiah's Sixth Amendment
exclusionary doctrine."
The modest object of the instant Article is to explore the substantive Sixth
Amendment ramifications of Fellers-the lessons that it teaches about the nature
and scope of the right to counsel. The steady, dramatic erosion of Miranda's Fifth
Amendment safeguards makes it all the more critical for the Court to preserve the
fundamental, albeit circumscribed, 9 constitutional protection against unfair conviction
"5 At least one other commentator formed the same impression. See William E. Hellerstein,
A Year to Remember: The Supreme Court's Fourth, Fifth, and SixthAmendment Jurisprudence
for the 2003 Term, 20 TOURO L. REV. 831, 858 (2005) (observing that Fellers "had the potential
to produce a decision of considerable significance, but [instead] ... went out with a whimper").
16 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
"7 My perceptive colleague, Professor Margaret Raymond, responded to the Supreme
Court's decision in Fellers with the immediate observation that it seemed likely the Eighth
Circuit would resolve the remanded exclusionary rule question in the government's favor and
the Supreme Court would then deny a petition for review of that decision. The Eighth Circuit
did exactly as Professor Raymond predicted. See United States v. Fellers, 397 F.3d 1090, 1098
(8th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court followed suit, validating the remainder of her prediction
by denying Fellers's effort to secure a second writ of certiorari. Fellers v. United States, 126
S. Ct. 415 (2005).
"S In a subsequent piece I plan to examine the exclusionary rule issue that was remanded
by the Supreme Court and that was the basis for Mr. Fellers's ultimate defeat in the Court of
Appeals. James J. Tomkovicz, Saving Massiahfrom Elstad: The Admissibility of Successive
Confessions Following a Deprivation of Counsel, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. (forthcoming
Feb. 2007) [hereinafter Tomkovicz, Saving Massiah]. That endeavor will necessitate a fresh
exploration of the premises underlying Sixth Amendment exclusion.
19 The pretrial right to counsel is severely restricted by the demand for a formal accusation.
The right "does not attach until after the initiation of formal charges." Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412,431 (1986). Moreover, the right to counsel is "offense specific"-i.e., although an
individual has been formally charged with one offense, he has no right to counsel for another,
uncharged offense unless the two constitute the "same offence" under the exceedingly narrow
standard of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S.
2006]
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afforded for more than forty years by the Massiah doctrine. Fellers powerfully re-
affirmed and preserved Massiah's substantive core, providing a foundation upon
which further defenses of the right to counsel might be erected.
I. THE FACTS, ISSUES, AND OPINIONS IN FELLERS v. UNITED STATES
This preliminary section describes the facts of and the substantive issues raised
in Fellers; the terse, cryptic, initial circuit court opinion; and the Supreme Court's
efficient reversal and remand.
A. The Facts
John Fellers was indicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.2 ° Sub-
sequently, officers went to his home to arrest him.2' After they identified them-
selves and asked to enter, Fellers invited the officers into his living room.22 They
informed him that he had been indicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphet-
amine and that they had a warrant for his arrest.23 They further explained that the
indictment described his involvement with other individuals. 24 After the officers
named four such persons, Fellers admitted "that he knew the four people and had
used methamphetamine during his association with them."25 Approximately fifteen
minutes later, the officers arrested him, took him to the county jail, booked him, and
escorted him to an interview room. 26 For the first time, the officers then recited the
Miranda warnings.27 Fellers provided both verbal and written waivers of his rights
before repeating the incriminating admissions he had made in his home.2 During
this "jailhouse interrogation," Fellers also confessed that he had purchased meth-
amphetamine from some of the named co-conspirators, had purchased and used
methamphetamine with several other individuals, and had loaned money to one in-
dividual implicated in the charged conspiracy "even though he suspected that the
money might have been used for drug transactions. ' 29 Throughout the process,
however, he "repeatedly denied that he had ever sold methamphetamine."3
162, 164, 167-68, 172-73 (2001).
20 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 521 (2004).
21 Id.
22 id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
2 id.
26 Id.; United States v. Fellers, 397 F.3d 1090, 1092 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 415 (2005).
27 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 521.
28 Id.; Fellers, 397 F.3d at 1092.
29 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 521; Fellers, 397 F.3d at 1092.
30 Fellers, 397 F.3d at 1092.
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Before trial, Fellers moved to suppress all of his inculpatory statements. 31 A
federal magistrate concluded that the statement in his home should be excluded
because the officers had Fellers in custody and "used deceptive stratagems to
prompt" that statement. 2 The magistrate believed that the statements at the jail
should also be suppressed because they "would not have been made but for the prior
ill-gotten statements. 33 A district court judge agreed that the in-home statements
had to be excluded from trial but decided that the jailhouse statements were admis-
sible under Oregon v. Elstad34 because Fellers "had knowingly and voluntarily waived
his Miranda rights before making the statements., 35 After a trial in which the prose-
cution introduced the jailhouse admissions, a jury convicted Fellers of conspiracy
to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute it. 36
B. The Court of Appeals Opinions
Fellers appealed, arguing that the jailhouse statements should have been sup-
pressed "as fruits of the statements obtained at his home in violation of the Sixth
Amendment." 37 The Eighth Circuit unanimously rejected his contention, sustaining
the district court's refusal to suppress the statements made at the jail and affirming
Fellers's conviction.3" The supporting reasoning occupied less than one printed
page.39 The two judges in the majority first noted that the "voluntariness of a con-
fession" is subject to "plenary appellate review"' and is determined by the "'totality
of the circumstances.'. 4 They next concluded that the Supreme Court's opinion in
Oregon v. Elstadundermined Fellers's suppression claim and rendered hisjailhouse
statements admissible.42 The majority rejected Fellers's argument that the officers'
"failure to administer the Miranda warnings at his home violated his sixth amend-
ment right to counsel... ."" The Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee was deemed
31 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 522.
32 United States v. Fellers, 285 F.3d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 2002).
33 Id.
34 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
31 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 522.
36 Id.
17 Id. According to the Eighth Circuit's opinion, Fellers "argue[d] that the district court
should have suppressed his inculpatory statements made at thejail because the primary taint
of the improperly elicited statements made at his home was not removed by the recitation of
his Miranda rights at the jail." Fellers, 285 F.3d at 724.
38 Fellers, 285 F.3d at 724.
39 id.
o Id. It is far from clear why the court mentioned the question of "voluntariness." The
facts of the case provide no support for a due process-coerced confession claim and there is
no indication that Fellers had raised such an unsustainable argument.
'" Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 320, 322 (8th Cir. 1994)).
42 Id.
43 Id.
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"not applicable" because "the officers did not interrogate Fellers at his home."'
Finally, the judges concluded that because the record supported the district court's
finding that the "jailhouse statements were knowingly and voluntarily made follow-
ing the administration of the Miranda warning,"45 the statements made at the jail
were properly admitted at trial.
A concurring judge disagreed with the conclusion that the officers' interaction with
the accused had not triggered an entitlement to the assistance of counsel.46 He observed
that for Sixth Amendment purposes, "an interrogation takes place when agents of law
enforcement deliberately attempt to elicit incriminating information from the indicted
defendant., 47 "[B]y telling Fellers they wanted to discuss his involvement in the use
and distribution of methamphetamine," the officers had "violated Fellers's right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment., 4' Although he found an initial failure to re-
spect Fellers's entitlement to counsel, the concurring judge agreed with the majority's
conclusion that the later jailhouse statements were admissible.49 He believed that
Elstad dictated that result because the officers had secured a waiver of rights prior to
securing those statements."0
C. The Supreme Court Opinion
In an informapauperis petition, Fellers successfully sought a writ of certiorari from
the Supreme Court.5 Two quite separable Sixth Amendment issues were presented.
The first involved the breadth of the out-of-court protection provided by the pretrial
right to counsel discerned in Massiah v. United States.2 The second involved the extent
of the exclusionary consequences that flow from a Massiah doctrine transgression.53
The "substantive" question was whether a known police officer's expression of a desire
to discuss criminal conduct that has been the subject of an indictment is conduct which
triggers an entitlement to counsel's assistance.' The "remedial" question was whether
the limitation upon the Miranda exclusionary rule announced in Oregon v. Elstad
is equally applicable to situations involving deprivations of the Sixth Amendment-
Massiah right to counsel.55
4 Id. (emphasis added).
4 Id.
4 Id. at 726-27 (Riley, J., concurring).
47 Id. at 726.
48 Id. at 727.
49 Id.
50 Id.
5' Fellers v. United States, 538 U.S. 905 (2003).
52 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519,524-25 (2004) (citing Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964)).
3 Id. at 525.
54 Id. at 524.
55 Id. at 525.
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The Supreme Court disposed of Fellers in four brief paragraphs of reasoning that
cover approximately two pages of text.56 In an opinion authored by Justice O'Connor,
a unanimous Court57 resolved the substantive issue5" and sent the exclusionary rule
question back to the Court of Appeals.59 Quoting Massiah, the wellspring of doc-
trine regarding the pretrial entitlement to counsel against official efforts to secure con-
fessions, the Court observed that it had previously held that "an accused is denied" the
Sixth Amendment entitlement to a lawyer's assistance "'when there [is] used against
him.., his own incriminating words, which.., agents [have] deliberately elicited
from him after he ha[s] been indicted and in the absence of his counsel. ' ' 60 Justice
O'Connor then documented what she described as the Court's "consistent[]" appli-
cation of "the deliberate-elicitation standard in subsequent Sixth Amendment cases.'
According to the Court, the Eighth Circuit had erred in concluding that the
"absence of an 'interrogation' foreclosed [Fellers's] claim that [his] j ailhouse state-
ments should have been suppressed as fruits of the statements taken... at his home.
62
The threshold requirements necessary to trigger Massiah doctrine protection were
clearly present. Because Fellers had already been indicted, there was an "initiation
of formal adversary judicial proceedings," '63 and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
had attached.' In addition, the officers came to his home, "informed him that their
purpose in coming was to discuss his involvement" in methamphetamine distribution
"and his association with certain charged co-conspirators," and discussed these matters
with him.65 There could be "no question that," by this conduct, "the officers...
'deliberately elicited' information" from the accused. 66 Because counsel was not
present and Fellers had not waived the right to assistance, "the Court of Appeals erred
56 Id. at 523-25.
57 Id. at 520.
58 Id. at 524-25.
'9 Id. at 525.
6 Id. at 523 (first alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964)).
61 Id. at 524. For support, Justice O'Connor cited United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264
(1980), and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
62 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 524.
63 United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 663,680 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States ex. rel
Hall v. Lane, 804 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1986)).
4 See Fellers, 540 U.S. at 524-25. The Court has repeatedly confirmed that the right to
counsel does not attach until the initiation of formal proceedings, the point at which a suspect
becomes an "accused" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., Illinois v.
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 299 (1990); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,431-32 (1986).
Fellers, 540 U.S. at 524.
Id. For this reason, the encounter between Fellers and the officers qualified as a "'criti-
cal stage[]' of the prosecution," at which the accused was entitled to assistance. See Henry,
447 U.S. at 269 (noting that right to counsel for pretrial "confrontations" after accusation hinges
on the determination of "whether they are 'critical stages' of the prosecution").
2006]
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in holding that the officers' actions did not violate the Sixth Amendment standards
established in Massiah, and its progeny. 67
According to Justice O'Connor, because the lower court had erroneously deter-
mined "that [Fellers] was not questioned in violation of Sixth Amendment standards,"
it had "improperly conducted its 'fruits' analysis under the Fifth Amendment."6 The
court had "not reach[ed] the question [of] whether the Sixth Amendment requires sup-
pression of [the] jailhouse statements on the ground that they were the fruits of previous
questioning conducted in violation of the Sixth Amendment deliberate-elicitation
standard."'69 Because the Supreme Court itself had not yet addressed "whether the
rationale of Elstad applies when a suspect makes incriminating statements after a
knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel notwithstanding earlier police
questioning in violation of Sixth Amendment standards," it remanded the case "to
the Court of Appeals to address this issue in the first instance. ''70
67 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 524-25 (citation omitted).
68 Id. at 525.
69 id.
70 Id. As noted in the Introduction, the Eighth Circuit ultimately held that Elstad dictated the
admission of Fellers's jailhouse statements, and the Supreme Court subsequently denied a
request for review. In another article devoted to the exclusionary rule question, I plan to
examine and critique in detail the Eighth Circuit's lengthy opinion on remand. Tomkovicz,
Saving Massiah, supra note 18.
In earlier Massiah precedents, the Court had made statements indicating that deliberate
elicitation of statements violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See, e.g., Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 178 n. 14 (1985) (Sixth Amendment "right was violated as soon as
the State's agent engaged Moulton in conversation about the charges pending against him");
id. at 176 (suggesting that when the State "knowingly circumvent[s] the accused's right to have
counsel present" and thereby obtains incriminating statements, "the Sixth Amendment is
violated"); Henry, 447 U.S. at 274 ("By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce [the
accused] to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government
violated [the accused]'s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.").
The Fellers Court repeatedly asserted that the officers had violated Sixth Amendment
standards, not once stating that their conduct constituted a violation of the Sixth Amendment
right at issue. See Fellers, 540 U.S. 519. I am hopeful that this careful expression reflects a
recognition by the Justices that a constitutional violation does not occur until the accused is
harmed by the use of his statements in court.
This interpretation makes the right similar to the Fifth Amendment privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination which cannot be violated by out-of-court conduct alone, but, instead,
is violated by the use of evidence in the courtroom. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760,767
(2003) (plurality opinion); id. at 777-79 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). I have sug-
gested before that the right-to-counsel deprivation begins during a pretrial encounter governed
by Massiah and is only completed when the government uses the products of the encounter at
trial. See James J. Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right to Exclusion: Constitutional Premises and
Doctrinal Implications, 67 N.C. L. REv. 751,762-75 (1989) [hereinafter Tomkovicz, Right to
Exclusion]. According to this view, exclusion under Massiah is an integral part of the constitu-
tional right, not merely a deterrent remedy. The Court has failed to clearly explain the premises
[Vol. 15:501
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1I. FELLERS AND THE PRETRIAL RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
This section first explains and analyzes the precedential significance of the Fellers
ruling. In fact, the Court's unanimous, simple, and straightforward ruling clarified
an ambiguity generated and perpetuated by opinions spanning the four decades between
Massiah and Fellers. Next, the discussion turns to the theoretical implications of the
holding. This Part explains and examines the nature of the constitutional premises
that must underlie and justify the Court's emphatic clarification of Sixth Amendment
doctrine. Finally, the controlling doctrinal criterion-"deliberate elicitation"-is
analyzed and a proposal for further clarification is offered. The Court has long evaded
the task of defining deliberate elicitation. Now that it has confirmed that standard's
determinative role in Sixth Amendment inquiries, it is time to illuminate its meaning.
A. The Banishment of Interrogation and the Recoronation of Deliberate Elicitation
A majority of the Eighth Circuit panel asserted that the officers' interaction with
Mr. Fellers in his home did not implicate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because
they "did not interrogate" him.7' In essence, the two judges in the majority concluded
that the officers' conduct during their encounter with the accused was not sufficiently
evocative to constitute a critical stage of the prosecution and require legal assistance.72
A unanimous Supreme Court held that the majority had applied the wrong standard
in judging whether the officers had crossed the Sixth Amendment's threshold.73
According to the Justices, the Court's "consistent[]" application of "the deliberate-
elicitation standard" in Massiah and subsequent interpretations made it clear that
"interrogation" is not a necessary predicate for the Sixth Amendment entitlement.74
The official conduct needed to trigger Miranda' s Fifth Amendment protection is not
required for Massiah's Sixth Amendment shelter. The right to counsel guards against
actions even less likely to induce a defendant to confess.75
1. The Mixed Messages of the Pertinent Precedents
The Fellers opinion pointedly observed that the Court had "consistently applied
the deliberate-elicitation standard in... Sixth Amendment cases,"76 suggesting that
that justify exclusion under Massiah. Id. at 792-93. Fellers could turn out to be even more sig-
nificant if it proves to be a first step toward a coherent explanation of Massiah-based exclusion.
Fellers v. United States, 285 F.3d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 2002).
72 See id.
73 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 524-25.
74 Id. at 524.
71 I explore whether actions must be "likely to succeed" to constitute deliberate elicitation
later in my analysis. See infra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
76 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 524.
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the Eighth Circuit's insistence upon interrogation was an obvious, somewhat incom-
prehensible, blunder. One might wonder how (or why) two members of the Eighth
Circuit could have misperceived the oft-reiterated refrain of Massiah precedents and
deemed "interrogation" to be a Sixth Amendment prerequisite. The answer could be
that the Supreme Court's Massiah opinions paint anything but a picture of consistency.7'
Instead, they are plagued by inveterate equivocation and unresolved ambiguity con-
cerning the nature of the conduct that gives rise to the entitlement to pretrial assistance.
Despite frequent endorsement of Massiah's original "deliberate-elicitation" formulation
and occasional efforts to clarify the governing standards, on a number of occasions
between 1964 and 2004 the Court itself insinuated the notion of "interrogation" into
right-to-counsel discussions, obscuring the Sixth Amendment's threshold.78
In Brewer v. Williams,79 the Court's first major post-Massiah opinion concerning
the right to pretrial assistance against efforts to secure inculpatory statements, Justice
Stewart (Massiah's author) played linguistically fast and loose with the doctrinal
standards governing the Sixth Amendment claim. He first observed that a detective
had "deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information from [the accused] just as
surely as ... if he had formally interrogated him."80 He next asserted that the lower
courts had found an entitlement "to the assistance of counsel" and that "no such consti-
tutional protection would have come into play if there had been no interrogation."8'
Justice Stewart did quote Massiah's governing holding that the accused was "'denied
the basic protections of'" the Sixth Amendment right to counsel "'when there was
used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal
agents had deliberately elicited from him.'- 82 In the very next paragraph, however, he
proceeded to declare that "the clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary proceedings
have commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when
the government interrogates him."83
77 I say "could" because there is no explicit indication in the Eighth Circuit's opinion that the
Supreme Court's vacillation and inconsistency were the source of its erroneous interpretation.
78 Even Massiah itself is not entirely blameless. After noting that Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315 (1959), involved police station interrogation, the majority approved the view of a
dissenter in the lower court that the right to counsel also "'must apply to indirect and surrep-
titious interrogations.' Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,206 (1964) (quoting United
States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 72 (2d Cir. 1962) (Hays, J., dissenting)). Thus, while holding
that deliberate elicitation implicated Massiah's right to counsel, the Court implicitly endorsed
a description of the conduct at stake as "surreptitious interrogations." Id. (emphasis added).
79 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
80 Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
81 Id. at 400 (emphasis added).
82 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206).
83 Id. at 401 (emphasis added). It is possible that the emotionally-charged nature of the case
and the divisive, controversial character of the holding that the accused had not in fact waived
his right to assistance prompted Justice Stewart's emphases on interrogation. The Court split
five to four on the waiver question. Dissenters expressed outrage at the majority's result in
[Vol. 15:501
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This seesawing between interrogation and deliberate elicitation engendered under-
standable confusion about the official conduct needed to constitute a "critical stage of
the prosecution"' for Massiah purposes. In two 1980 opinions, the Court confronted
the question head on, providing what appeared to be definitive clarification. According
to Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Rhode Island v. Innis,"5 it was "erroneous" to
conclude that "the definition of 'interrogation' under Miranda [was] informed by
th[e] Court's decision in Brewer v. Williams" because the latter opinion was concemed
"solely" with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel which "prohibits law enforce-
ment officers from 'deliberately elicit[ing]' incriminating information." 6 And in
United States v. Henry,7 Chief Justice Burger asserted that even though "affirmative
interrogation.., would certainly satisfy Massiah.... Brewer v. Williams [did not]
modifiy] Massiah's 'deliberately elicited' test"' 8-i.e., it did not elevate the Sixth
Amendment's doctrinal demand to "interrogation." Thus did Innis and Henry endeavor
to clear away the cobwebs spun by Williams. Their combined message seemed both
lucid and sensible: Interrogation is a Fifth Amendment-privilege-based demand im-
posed by the Miranda doctrine and rooted in the constitutional concept of compulsion.
The Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee is less demanding; it requires only "deliberate
elicitation" and thereby regulates a wider range of conduct that encompasses both
interrogation and "lesser" efforts to secure incriminating admissions.
atypically inflammatory, accusatory language. See id. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The
result in this case ought to be intolerable in any society which purports to call itself...
organized .. "); id. at 417 (charging that the majority had "regresse[d] to playing a grisly
game of 'hide and seek,"' and had reached a "bizarre result"); id. at 437 (White, J., dissenting)
(accusing the majority of the "extremely serious" consequence of releasing a "mentally dis-
turbed killer whose guilt is not in question"); id. at 438 (calling the "result in this case...
utterly senseless"). Justice Stewart might have believed that his stress on the offensive nature
of the officer's actions-that is, that he had not merely engaged the accused in conversation,
but had actually conducted an "interrogation"-lent additional, if implicit, force to the major-
ity's conclusion that a waiver had not been proven and responded, albeit subtly, to the dis-
senters' cries.
14 United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 269 (1980).
85 446 U.S. 291 (1980). It is interesting that Justice Stewart is responsible for the original
opinion in Massiah, for the unclarity and confusion generated by Williams, and for the
attempt to clarify the doctrine in Innis.
86 Id. at 300 n.4 (second alteration in original). The Court's clarification effort was not
entirely successful, however. Justice Stewart proceeded to assert that "[t]he definitions of
'interrogation' under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, if indeed the term 'interrogation' is
even apt in the Sixth Amendment context, are not necessarily interchangeable, since the policies
underlying the two constitutional protections are quite distinct." Id. (emphasis added). Thus,
while he did question the appropriateness of using the term "interrogation" to describe the
Sixth Amendment's concern, Justice Stewart did not decisively purge the word from Sixth
Amendment discourse.
87 447 U.S. 264.
88 Id. at 271 (citation omitted).
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The Court apparently found consistency to be "the hobgoblin of little minds."89
Five years later, in Maine v. Moulton,9" the majority asserted that a turncoat code-
fendant's active conversation with the accused satisfied the deliberate-elicitation
requirement but inexplicably described his role "in this conversation [as] 'the func-
tional equivalent of interrogation.' 91 And just one year after that, in Kuhlmann v.
Wilson,92 the majority again succumbed to the temptation to entangle Fifth and Sixth
Amendment terminology. In a case involving ajailhouse informant's passive listen-
ing to incriminating disclosures by an accused, Justice Powell first documented the
Court's use of the term "interrogation" in a number of Sixth Amendment pre-
cedents.93 He then offered an explanation for that phenomenon, declaring it "clear
[that] the primary concern of the Massiah line of decisions is secret interrogation by
investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police interrogation."'94
The Court ultimately announced that to succeed with a Sixth Amendment claim
"the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some
action. . . that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks." 95 In the
wake of the renewed emphasis on "interrogation," however, not-so-little minds might
understandably have found the Sixth Amendment's doctrinal demands to have been
anything but clear. A judge could reasonably have concluded that "interrogation"
was, at least in some settings, a necessary trigger for Sixth Amendment protection.
2. Options Available to and the Path Chosen by the Fellers Court
In Fellers, the Court chose to ignore the several instances in which it had en-
gendered confusion about the relevance of interrogation to Massiah analyses. In-
stead, the Court proclaimed that it had "consistently applied the deliberate-elicitation
89 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS: FIRST SERIES (1841), reprinted in
JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 497 (15th ed. 1980) ("A foolish consistency is the
hobgoblin of little minds ....").
90 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
91 Id. at 177 n.13 (quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 277 (Powell, J., concurring)).
92 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
93 Id. at 456-60. Justice Powell noted that the pretrial right to counsel recognized in
Massiah had roots in the view of concurring Justices in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959), a case involving police interrogation. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 456. He stated that the
Massiah majority had "adopted the reasoning of the" Spano concurrences and had "made
clear that it was concerned with interrogation or investigative techniques that were equivalent
to interrogation." Id. at 457. Powell next opined that the Henry Court had emphasized that,
just as in Massiah, the facts before it amounted to "indirect and surreptitious interrogatio[n]."
Id. at 458 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Finally, he observed that the Moulton
majority had borrowed language from his concurrence in Henry, describing the "informant's
participation" in conversation with the defendant as "'the functional equivalent of inter-
rogation."' Id. at 459 (quoting Moulton, 474 U.S. 159).
94 Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459 (emphasis added).
9' Id. (emphasis added).
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standard. '9 6 Justice O'Connor might have been more forthright about the ambiguities
in the precedents. She could have acknowledged the Justices' proclivity for injecting
"interrogation" into Sixth Amendment discussions before banishing the term once
and for all and declaring deliberate elicitation to be the sole governing criterion. Alter-
natively, she might have clarified the law by offering a substantive explanation for
the refusal to eliminate interrogation from Massiah discussions once and for all.
In fact, it was logically possible to reconcile both the language and the results in
all the Massiah precedents by endorsing a simple doctrinal dichotomy tied to the char-
acter of the government agent who actually confronts an accused. The recurrent refer-
ences to the concept of "interrogation" in Sixth Amendment opinions could have been
harmonized with assertions that only deliberate elicitation is required by distinguishing
between situations involving confrontations with undercover government agents (or
"informants") and those involving encounters with known officers.97
Reasoning in Massiah itself could have supported a regime of dual governing
standards. The Massiah Court first announced the "deliberate-elicitation" standard in
a case that involved surreptitious efforts to secure incriminating admissions. According
to the Court, the elicitation by an undercover government operative sufficed because
it was an even more serious imposition than interrogation by known officers.98 The
next opportunity the Court had to discuss Sixth Amendment doctrine was Brewer v.
Williams, a case involving an encounter between an accused and a known law enforce-
ment officer.9 In that context, the Court declared that there would have been no entitle-
ment to counsel without "interrogation."'" Soon thereafter, in United States v. Henry,'0 '
the Court denied any need for "affirmative interrogation," suggesting that Williams's
references to interrogation were not intended to modify the governing doctrine. 0 2
Henry, however, involved undercoverefforts by a cellmate to secure inculpatory ad-
missions.10 3 In Maine v. Moulton, 14 another unknown government operative situation,
96 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524 (2004).
9 Such a doctrinal dichotomy can find clear support in Justice Powell's concurring opinion
in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring), and in the
opinion he authored for the majority in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. at 458-59. Justice
Blackmun made it clear, in Brewer v. Williams, that in his view when known police officers
confront an accused the Sixth Amendment is implicated only when the officers engage in
"interrogation." 430 U.S. 387, 439-40 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) ("'Massiah was more seriously
imposed upon .. .because he did not even know that he was under interrogation by a
government agent."' (quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1962)
(Hays, J., dissenting)). The Court did not explain why the imposition was more serious in cases
involving surreptitious confrontation of the accused.
9 430 U.S. 387.
'0o Id. at 401.
'0' 447 U.S. 264.
102 Id. at271.
103 Id. at 266.
'04 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
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the majority recited and applied the deliberate-elicitation standard, finding it satis-
fied.0 5 It furnished potential support for a scheme that involved dual standards,
however, by describing the undercover agent's conduct as "'the functional equiva-
lent of interrogation. ' 106 Finally, in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 7 the last pre-Fellers word
on the question, the Court provided the clearest indication of any Massiah case that
surreptitious efforts to secure statements were governed by the "deliberate-elicitation"
standard while encounters with known police officers might have to involve actual
"interrogation." According to the majority, "the primary concern of the Massiah line
of decisions is secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent
of direct police interrogation."'' 8 It would have been entirely plausible to understand
this assertion as an endorsement of distinct standards for the two different settings.
Furthermore, an endorsement of this dichotomy would have been fully consis-
tent with the outcomes of the Massiah cases. The pre-Fellers cases finding the Sixth
Amendment violated by mere conversation that amounted to "deliberate elicitation"
all involved undercover operatives."° The cases in which known officers ran afoul of
Massiah' s mandate entailed conduct that unquestionably constituted "interrogation"
under Miranda-i.e., express questioning or its clear functional equivalent."0 Despite
the recitation of the deliberate-elicitation standard in known officer cases,"' not a
single case before Fellers had concluded that an accused had a Sixth Amendment
right to assistance-much less that the Sixth Amendment was violated-when
officers engaged in conduct that fell short of interrogation." 2
'o' Id. at 173, 176.
" Id. at 177 n.13 (quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 277 (Powell, J., concurring)).
107 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
oS Id. at 459 (emphasis added). The author of the majority opinion, Justice Lewis Powell,
had previously espoused the view that an undercover agent has to engage in more than
"incidental conversation" with an accused in order to implicate the right to counsel. See
Henry, 447 U.S. at 277 (Powell, J., concurring). According to Justice Powell, an "informant
[must] deliberately elicit[] incriminating information by" engaging in "conduct that... is the
functional equivalent of interrogation." Id. In Kuhlmann, Justice Powell found a majority
willing to support his phrasing of the standards that define the Sixth Amendment threshold.
477 U.S. 436.
'" See, e.g., Moulton, 474 U.S. 159; Henry, 447 U.S. 264; Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964).
i10 See, e.g., Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
(1977); see also Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285,292-97,300 (1988) (concluding that law
enforcement authorities had not deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
because they had secured valid waivers before "questioning" him).
., See, e.g., Jackson, 475 U.S. at 630 (holding that after formal charges, Sixth Amendment
applies to "government efforts to elicit information from the accused"); Williams, 430 U.S.
at 400 (quoting Massiah's "deliberately elicited" standard).
112 In Williams, the Court held that the interrogation had occurred in the absence of a valid
waiver, and, thus, that the accused had been deprived of his Sixth Amendment entitlement to
counsel. 430 U.S. at 400. In Jackson, the Court found a Sixth Amendment deprivation because
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An additional reason why it would not have been implausible to interpret the
Massiah precedents as endorsing and adopting dual standards for the government
behavior that entitles an accused to counsel is the Court's persistent failure to explain
the constitutional rationales for extending the explicit guarantee of trial counsel to
pretrial efforts to secure inculpatory admissions." 3 Without identification of the Sixth
Amendment policies or objectives that justify the right to assistance guaranteed by
the Massiah doctrine, there is no theoretical basis for determining whether it makes
sense to demand Miranda-type interrogation when known officers are involved.
Because it chose to assert that its opinions had been "consistent," the Court made
no mention of the fact that Fellers involved a substantive Sixth Amendment issue of
first impression. It was the first case to squarely raise the question of whether an
accused has a right to assistance in situations where known state agents elicit without
interrogating. Unless the Court was willing to disagree with the lower court's determi-
nation that the officers' conduct at Fellers's home did not constitute interrogation, "4
Fellers required it to decide whether the deliberate-elicitation standard governs con-
frontations with known officers. Put otherwise, the Court had to determine whether
deliberate elicitation by undercover agents is regulated because it is the "functional
officers initiated interrogation of an accused who had invoked his right to counsel. 475 U.S.
at 636. And in Patterson, the majority had "no doubt" that the accused had a right to counsel
at "interviews with law enforcement authorities," that the Court subsequently described as
"postindictment questioning." 487 U.S. at 290,292 (emphasis added). The Court deemed the
questioning permissible because the defendant had been given sufficient information to make
a "knowing" waiver of his right. Id. at 299-300. Finally, in Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001),
the Court rejected a right to counsel claim only because the defendant had not been formally
charged with the crimes at issue at the time he was confronted by officers. Id. at 163. While the
Supreme Court's opinion does not describe the conduct of the officers that produced the defen-
dant's confession, the lower court opinion asserted that the officers had "interrogated him" by
engaging in "ninety minutes of questioning." See Cobb v. State, 93 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000).
113 At this point, perhaps a more accurate characterization is "persistent refusal." In Massiah,
Justice White challenged the Court to justify its pretrial extension to undercover elicitation,
proffering several reasons why no right to counsel should be recognized in that case and similar
situations. 377 U.S. at 208-12 (White, J., dissenting). Later, in Henry, Justice Rehnquist picked
up the same cudgel, reinforced it, and used it to challenge the legitimacy of the Massiah
entitlement to assistance. 447 U.S. at 289-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also James J.
Tomkovicz, Against the Tide: Rehnquist's Efforts to Curtail Expansion of the Right to Counsel,
in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 129, 146 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006) [hereinafter Tomkovicz,
Against the Tide]. Despite these direct challenges to the constitutional legitimacy of a right
against pretrial efforts to elicit admissions, majorities have not offered any explanation of that
right's logical underpinnings. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
114 That option would not have been attractive to a Court determined to weaken the pro-
tection afforded by the Miranda doctrine. To hold that the officer's minimal conduct at Fellers's
home was interrogation could have implicitly expanded that concept and invited lower courts
to follow suit. The result of a more expansive understanding of interrogation, of course, would
be more generous Miranda shelter.
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equivalent of interrogation" by known officers." 5 The Court rose to the occasion, pro-
viding the clearest of answers. After Fellers, the threshold requirement in all Massiah
contexts-those involving undercover agents and those involving known government
officials-is nothing more nor less than "deliberate elicitation."' 1 6 There is but one
regime and it constrains both types of government agent from "deliberately eliciting"
admissions from an accused in the absence of counsel or a valid waiver of assistance.
The significance of this conclusion is far from negligible. By so holding, the Court
decisively resolved a longstanding, yet virtually unacknowledged, doctrinal ambiguity
regarding the breadth of a fundamental constitutional right."7
The Fellers ruling constitutes a significant advance in the evolution of Sixth
Amendment doctrine. Unfortunately, the Court failed to exploit an opportunity to
make much more progress. From its inception, the Massiah doctrine has been seriously
deficient in more than one respect. The most significant deficiency is theoretical. From
the start, and throughout the forty years since Massiah, the Court has failed to explain
the Sixth Amendment premises that justify a pretrial right to counsel against deliberate
elicitation by government officials.'" In Fellers, the Court had the opportunity to
remedy that deficiency by explaining the constitutional underpinnings for its rejection
of an interrogation requirement and reaffirmation of a single deliberate-elicitation
". See Henry, 447 U.S. at 277 (Powell, J., concurring).
16 The Court's opinions in Henry, 447 U.S. 264, and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159
(1985), do impose a separable requirement in cases involving undercover informants. Not only
must the informant engage in active elicitation, but there must be a sufficient factual basis-
beyond mere recruitment-for attributing that conduct to government agents. Henry declared
it sufficient that the government "intentionally creat[ed] a situation likely to induce [the
accused] to make incriminating statements." 447 U.S. at 274. Moulton held that "knowing
exploitation.., of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel" also suffices. 474
U.S. at 176. For discussion of this additional demand in surreptitious elicitation contexts, see
JAMEs J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 93-94 (2002) [hereinafter
TOMKOVICz, RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE]; James J. Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of the
Right to Counsel Against Informants: Truth, Fair Play, and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Tomkovicz, Adversary System].
"' The right to counsel is arguably the most fundamental of all the entitlements accorded a
defendant by our Constitution. See TOMKOVICZ, RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE, supra note 116, at 45.
Perhaps it is premature to conclude that Fellers has eliminated the concept of interro-
gation from Sixth Amendment discourse once and for all. It would not be entirely unreasonable
to fear that at the next opportunity the Court will once again find "interrogation" a useful term
for analyzing a Sixth Amendment claim. Nonetheless, the unanimity, directness, and clarity
of the Court's opinion leaves no doubt that for the present "deliberate elicitation" is the sole
criterion for determining whether the accused's encounter with any state agent is a "'critical
stage []' of the prosecution." See Henry, 447 U.S. at 269. For now, interrogation has been exiled
from Massiah's Sixth Amendment realm and relegated to the Fifth Amendment-Miranda
domain for which it was designed.
118 For a discussion of the inadequacy of the Court's explanations of justifications for
the Massiah right, see Tomkovicz, Adversary System, supra note 116, at 22-24. See also
TOMKOVICZ, RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE, supra note 116, at 45.
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threshold. The Court apparently felt no need to provide a rationale for its decision,
i.e., to root the rule of Fellers in a coherent understanding of the reasons for granting
an entitlement to assistance. Instead, it was content to rely on the alleged "consistency"
of confusing precedents that were equally devoid of constitutional justifications.
Another notable deficiency is doctrinal. In the four decades since Massiah the
Court has failed to define the determinative criterion-"deliberate elicitation." '119 The
clarifying force of Fellers's ruling that a single deliberate-elicitation standard defines
the threshold of the right to counsel surely is undermined by a failure to explain more
precisely what those terms signify and encompass. Fellers offered a golden oppor-
tunity to give meaning and content to the concept-i.e., to explain the nature of the
conduct that is necessary, and sufficient, for an entitlement to legal assistance and to
expound upon the differences between Sixth and Fifth Amendment policies. Instead,
the Court merely declared that there was "no question" that the officers' conduct in
Fellers constituted deliberate elicitation.120 The practical impacts of the Court's im-
portant endorsement of a single standard-the concrete consequences of holding that
the Massiah entitlement is always triggered by deliberate elicitation--depend entirely
on the differences between deliberate elicitation and interrogation. Yet the Court
neglected to illuminate those differences. 121
The remaining two subsections of this Article address these significant theoretical
and doctrinal deficiencies. Based on the simple holding announced in Fellers, I believe
it is possible to make logical inferences about underlying theoretical premises-i.e.,
to discern an understanding of the right to counsel that canjustify the Massiah right.
Moreover, the premises that appear to underlie the Massiah right to assistance might
be used to shed additional light on the meaning of deliberate elicitation.'22
119 This is not to say that the Court has completely neglected the deliberate-elicitation
demand. In Henry and Moulton, majorities discussed the necessary relationship between regular
government officials and undercover agents, announcing standards for determining whether
informants' actions are attributable to the government. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176 (con-
cluding that knowingly exploiting an opportunity to confront an accused absent counsel
suffices as a basis for attribution); Henry, 447 U.S. at 270-71 (holding that intentional creation
of situation likely to induce statements is a basis for attribution). In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477
U.S. 436, 458-59 (1986), the majority concluded that active elicitation is required and that
the passive receipt of disclosures is insufficient to deprive an accused of counsel. Nonetheless,
as will be seen below, there remain troubling ambiguities about the meaning of deliberate
elicitation that a comprehensive definition could eliminate.
120 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524 (2004).
121 Yet another major deficiency in the Supreme Court's explanation of the Massiah doc-
trine is its failure to clearly and comprehensively explain the character of and rationales for
exclusion. I have discussed that topic on a prior occasion. See Tomkovicz, Right to Exclusion,
supra note 70, at 762-72. Moreover, I intend to return to that topic in a piece addressing the
Elstad question remanded in Fellers. Tomkovicz, Saving Massiah, supra note 18.
122 In addition, the premises can be of enormous assistance in analyzing the exclusionary
rule issue remanded to the Eighth Circuit in Fellers and in informing Sixth Amendment
exclusion questions in general. The rationales for "exclusionary rules" are vitally important.
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B. The Constitutional Logic Underlying Fellers: Why Interrogation Is Not
Necessary and Deliberate Elicitation Is Sufficient
The most serious inadequacy has been the Court's utter failure to explain the
logical underpinnings for the pretrial extension of counsel defined by Massiah and
its offspring.'23 That fundamental deficiency has left Massiah vulnerable to intense
criticism from opponents. 24 In my view, the modest holding of Fellers that interro-
gation is never required and that deliberate elicitation is always sufficient to trigger
a counsel entitlement reflects a particular conception of the constitutional justifi-
cations for the Massiah right to assistance.
"Interrogation" has always played a central, defining role in Miranda law. 25 It
constitutes one of the two essential prerequisites 126 that trigger the warnings and waiver
scheme and the additional protections that guard against violations of the Fifth
Because Miranda exclusion is merely a means of enforcing Fifth Amendment rights but is
not itself a constitutional right, and because Fourth Amendment exclusion is a future-oriented
deterrent safeguard, the government may use illegally obtained evidence to impeach an
accused's testimony. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (evidence obtained
in violation of Fourth Amendment may be used to impeach the accused); Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements secured in violation of Miranda are admissible to impeach
defendant). On the other hand, exclusion under the Due Process-coerced confession doctrine
is, in fact, part of the constitutional right to fundamental fairness in the conduct of trials.
Consequently, impeachment use of coerced statements is impermissible. See Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385,396-402 (1978). In the subsequent piece that addresses the application of the
Elstad doctrine to Massiah violations, I will examine Fellers's ramifications for the doctrine
that governs Sixth Amendment exclusion. Tomkovicz, Saving Massiah, supra note 18.
123 The Massiah doctrine is genuinely anomalous in this respect. I cannot think of another
doctrine in constitutional criminal procedure that is so totally devoid of underlying reasoning
connecting it to the objectives of the guarantee which it purports to construe. This is not to
say that the Court's explanations of other doctrines are complete or entirely comprehensible,
but in other areas the Court at least has made some effort to explain the logic that justifies
its doctrinal translations of specific constitutional commands.
124 For a discussion of the Court's failure to explain and the criticisms leveled by oppo-
nents, see Tomkovicz, Adversary System, supra note 116, at 25-35.
'2 In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren made it repeatedly clear that the sole focus of concern
was custodial interrogation-the atmosphere generated by that practice and the resulting endan-
germent of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 447-49,
455 (1966); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,486 (1981) (observing that "[a]bsent...
interrogation" there would be no Fifth Amendment problem); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291,299 (1980) (noting thatMiranda's concern was "the 'interrogation environment' created
by the interplay interrogation and custody" (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58)).
126 The other, of course, is "custody." See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,441-42
(1984) (holding that because an ordinary traffic stop does not generate sufficient threats of
compulsion it does not qualify as custody for purposes of Miranda and, therefore, does not
trigger the need for warnings). No Miranda doctrine protection is available unless both custody
and interrogation are present.
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Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. 127 The Fifth Amend-
ment privilege is not a guarantee against self-incrimination; it protects a person only
against being compelled to be a witness against himself.2 ' Thus, that guarantee leaves
the government entirely free to seek admissions and to convict based on those ad-
missions, as long as it does not employ pressure to force them from a person's mind.
Interrogation encompasses those official actions that, when coupled with custody, are
sufficient to justify a presumption of compulsion to speak.129 Government agents
interrogate only when they subject a suspect to "express questioning or its func-
tional equivalent"' 3 - i.e., "words or actions... that [they] should know are reason-
ably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."'' Moreover, only
"official interrogation" qualifies-that is, the conduct that constitutes interrogation
must be performed by someone known by the suspect to be a government agent.
32
These doctrinal demands are firmly rooted in the essence of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege-shelter against compulsion. In the Court's view, it is fair to pre-
sume that a suspect in custody has not responded freely, but instead has been forced
to speak, only when he is subjected to an express question or to equally evocative
verbal or nonverbal conduct by an official known to possess governmental author-
ity. 33 There is a constitutionally defensible basis for demanding that official conduct
be of this nature to trigger Fifth Amendment scrutiny. Absent "official interrogation"
so defined, the constitutional privilege against compelled disclosure is not in jeop-
ardy and the interests that justify this protection against government-compelled
disclosure are not at risk.
34
127 By "additional protections," I refer to the Miranda safeguards triggered by invocation
of the right to remain silent, see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), and invocation of
the Miranda entitlement to counsel, see Edwards, 451 U.S. at 477. In both instances, special
safeguards against invalid waivers arise.
128 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
129 Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 (1980). Although the confluence of custody and interrogation
give rise to apresumption of compulsion, according to the prevailing interpretation of Miranda,
custodial interrogation alone does not justify a finding of actual compulsion. See Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,654, 658 n.7 (1984).
30 Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01.
13' Id. at 301 (citations omitted).
132 See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990).
... See, e.g., id.
"3 According to Miranda, the Fifth Amendment privilege "is founded on a complex of
values." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). Its "foundation... is the respect a
government... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." Id. The privilege
is designed "[t]o maintain a 'fair state-individual balance,' to require the government 'to shoul-
der the entire load,' [and] to respect the inviolability of the human personality." Id. (citation
omitted). In a later opinion in Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993), the Court explained
the fundamental values reflected in the privilege: a "preference for an accusatorial" system,
a fear of inhumane treatment, a sense that fair play dictates a balance in which the govern-
ment shoulders the load, a "respect for the inviolability of the human personality," a "distrust
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In Fellers, all nine Justices agreed that "interrogation" is not an appropriate de-
terminant of whetheran accused has a pretrial entitlement to the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel. 35 This conclusion first reflects a pragmatic belief that "interro-
gation," a term with a well-developed Fifth Amendment meaning, should not be used
in Sixth Amendment contexts to signify a distinct type of governmental conduct. 1
36
More importantly, the Court's holding that the Eighth Circuit erred in demanding
interrogation must rest on the substantive premise that the right to counsel and the
values it furthers are imperiled by official conduct that does not rise to the level of
"interrogation" as defined by Miranda law. 1
37
Fellers resoundingly, though inexplicitly, reaffirmed a relatively simple, but im-
portant, point about Sixth Amendment "policies"-that they are distinct from those
that undergird the Fifth Amendment privilege and its Miranda doctrine. 3 Put other-
wise, the Fellers holding reflects the view that the interests and values furthered by
the right to counsel are different from and independent of the policies served by the
privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
Most significantly, Fellers appears to reflect an expansive conception of the ob-
jectives of guaranteeing a constitutional entitlement to legal assistance. The Massiah
of self-deprecatory statements," and a concern with protecting innocent persons against mis-
treatment and erroneous convictions. Id. at 692 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of
New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
13' Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 525 (2004).
136 To use the same term to refer to a different sort of official conduct-particularly in two
related contexts--can only lead to confusion. Unless interrogation as defined in Miranda cases
has a role to play in Sixth Amendment analysis, it seems eminently wise to purge the term from
the latter context. In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Court indicated that the term "interrogation"
may not be "apt" under the Sixth Amendment. 446 U.S. at 300 n.4. In Fellers, the Court effec-
tively held that the term is not appropriate in Sixth Amendment settings. After Fellers, there-
fore, a judge should never inquire into whether interrogation has occurred in deciding whether
an accused was deprived of counsel. All that needs to be determined is whether the govern-
ment deliberately elicited information. Fellers, 540 U.S. at 524-25.
"3' Although Fellers's holding that one standard of conduct governs all state agents serves
the interest in simple, clear constitutional doctrine, dual standards would hardly have made
Massiah doctrine inordinately complex. In the first place, the nuances of "interrogation" have
largely been worked out by Miranda cases. Moreover, the criterion that would have determined
whether interrogation or deliberate elicitation was necessary to constitute a critical stage-
whether the confrontation was with an undercover agent or a known law enforcement officer-
would have posed few difficulties. Consequently, clarity alone was hardly an adequate reason
to eliminate interrogation.
138 I say "reaffirmed" because the Court explicitly endorsed this proposition in Innis, 446
U.S. at 300 n.4. In Innis, the fact that the policies were distinct led the Court to eschew reliance
on a Sixth Amendment precedent in defining the conduct that is sufficient to trigger Miranda's
Fifth Amendment safeguards. Id. In Fellers, the differences in the objectives of the privilege
and the right to counsel produced a holding that the conduct necessary to trigger Miranda's
protections is not a necessary predicate for Sixth Amendment coverage. Fellers, 540 U.S. at
524-25 (2004).
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right to counsel is a pretrial extension of the right to trial assistance. 3 9 According
to the Court, the central purpose of this trial right is to ensure that an accused receives
a "fair trial.""4 That simple description of the guarantee's ultimate purpose, however,
is not particularly informative. Most, if not all, constitutional rights pertaining to the
criminal process are designed in some way to promote the "fair" resolution of accu-
sations. For present purposes, the important question is how a right to the assistance
of counsel ensures a fair adjudication of guilt.
It seems elementary that lawyers promote fair trials by ensuring that innocent
defendants are not convicted either as a result of their unfamiliarity with the law or
their vulnerability to official pressures to make false inculpatory admissions. Counsel
"equalizes" an accused by furnishing the legal knowledge and expertise a lay accused
lacks, enabling him to cope with the legal system and the trained, motivated prose-
cutor.141 Without assistance, the outcome of a prosecution might be skewed simply
because a defendant lacks legal training or is unequipped to withstand official pressures.
The right to counsel against deliberate elicitation by undercover agents or known
officials is not necessary to prevent disadvantages resulting from a lack of legal ex-
pertise or to shield against pressures to cooperate. The "critical stages" identified in
Massiah and refined by subsequent opinions involve no questions of a technical, legal
nature and mere "elicitation" is not inherently coercive-i.e., it does not threaten an
accused's freedom of choice.142 The Court's conclusion that deliberate elicitation
1' The right to counsel was intended as a right to assistance at trial. See United States v.
Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973) (noting that history shows that "the core purpose of the counsel
guarantee was to assure 'Assistance' at trial"); see also TOMKOVICZ, RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE,
supra note 116, at 81. Extension of this fundamental right to the period following accusation
but preceding trial was essential to avoid circumvention of the guarantee of assistance and
erosion, if not evisceration, of the interests served and safeguarded by granting those on trial
an entitlement to expert legal assistance. See Ash, 413 U.S. at 310-11 ("[C]hanging patterns
of criminal procedure and investigation" prompted the Court to expand guarantee of counsel
to pretrial settings that present "the same dangers that gave birth initially to the right itself');
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (asserting that because "today's law enforce-
ment machinery involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution" before trial
that "might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality," guar-
antee of assistance has been construed "to apply to 'critical' stages" prior to trial).
"4 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,684 (1984) (rooting ineffective assistance
of counsel doctrine in the notion that the purpose of Sixth Amendment entitlement is to ensure
a "fair trial"); Wade, 388 U.S. at 224, 226-27 (extending right to counsel to pretrial lineup be-
cause counsel's absence endangers the "right to a fair trial" and the "security of that right is...
the aim of the right to counsel"); see also TOMKOvIcz, RIGHT TO AssISTANCE, supra note 116,
at 45-50, 122-23, 155-56.
141 See Ash, 413 U.S. at 309.
'42 These premises have supported critics' claims that Massiah is an indefensible extension
of the right to trial counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 289-90 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 209 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting). I have no doubt about the accuracy of these factual premises; it seems clear that
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by any government agent generates a need for counsel's aid must rest on a broader
understanding of the fair-trial interests served by the Sixth Amendment right.
Fellers furnishes potent, albeit inexplicit, support for the view that, in our adversary
system, once the battle has been commenced by the filing of formal charges it is unfair
for the government to engage or interact with an unassisted accused in ways that en-
hance its opportunity to secure a conviction.143 The Court's decision to constrain all
deliberate elicitation by informants or officers makes it clear that a defense lawyer is
expected to do more than furnish technical legal expertise or guard against official
pressures to speak. Counsel is to serve as a partisan, a champion, and an all-purpose
assistant. Counsel is empowered and expected to shield the accused against any official
effort to induce him to help the state's quest to convict and against any kind of dis-
advantage flowing out of "confrontations" with state agents.
According to this view, counsel does not merely protect innocent defendants
against inaccurate convictions. Counsel helps every defendant-innocent and guilty
alike-make self-protective decisions about the wisdom of assisting his adversary.
A trial or any postaccusation pretrial process is "unfair" if the government seeks to
take advantage of an unassisted opponent. Attorneys ensure fair adversarial contests
by providing input and advice-i.e., "counsel," broadly defined-that can help the ac-
cused fend off the government's efforts to secure a conviction. A critical compo-
nent of the entitlement to assistance is advice about the advisability of cooperating
by divulging potentially damaging information. Before making a decision to share
what he knows with the state, an accused is entitled to the expertise of a trained
lawyer who is familiar with the system and understands its nuances and pitfalls.
Put simply, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the aid of a loyal assistant
devoted entirely to his interests, an equalizer who knows the factual, legal, and practical
ramifications and perils of sharing information with the government. A fair adversarial
contest is one with a fully-equalized accused who has access to unrestricted advice
about the advantages, disadvantages, and potential consequences of confrontations
with his committed, powerful opponent.'"
deliberate elicitation, whether by an undercover informant or a known police officer, does not
involve substantive or procedural legal intricacies and does not generate cognizable pressures
that might overcome an accused's free will. I do disagree with the assumption that these are
the only perils against which the right to counsel affords protection.
141 Looked at from the defendant's standpoint, the protection is against official actions that in-
crease the risk of an unfavorable outcome whether or not that outcome is accurate and justified.
144 A defendant's entitlement to assistance is not entirely unrestricted. Ethical constraints and
the obligation not to serve conflicting interests do limit what a lawyer may do to champion an
accused's cause. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (concluding that
counsel may not represent the accused if such representation would conflict with obligations
to another client); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that ethical obligation not
to put on perjured testimony or false evidence limits what counsel may do for client). In such
cases, countervailing interests outweigh the defendant's interests in assistance and justify the
limitation. There is no comparable basis, however, for restricting the input provided by defense
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There is no irrefutable historical or other evidence that this broad understanding
of counsel's purposes is correct. Narrower conceptions of Sixth Amendment fair trial
interests are conceivable. A more restrictive vision could have supported the con-
clusion that undercover agents may not deliberately elicit, whereas known officers
may not interrogate. One might plausibly argue, for example, that the government
acts unfairly only when it disadvantages an accused by either deceiving or pressuring
him into admitting or disclosing evidence of guilt. False friends 4 5 who elicit by mere
conversation would violate canons of fair play because they gain advantages by deceit.
Because deception is absent when known officers openly confront an accused, un-
fairness would result only when those officers employ pressure to induce an accused
to cooperate-i.e., only when they engage in interrogation. This alternative under-
standing of adversary system fair play could rest on the premise that a lay accused is
fully capable of making an informed, uncoerced decision about whether to reveal infor-
mation to his adversary. He needs no equalizer unless officials employ either deceptive
or coercive techniques."'
Whatever the merits of this more limited understanding of the nature of adversary
system fair play,' 47 it is implicitly rejected by the conclusion in Fellers that a defendant
has a right to counsel when a known police officer actively elicits information by means
that are neither deceptive nor coercive.' The Court's unanimous ruling would seem
counsel to technical legal matters alone.
"' False friends include cellmates, codefendants, and others who are secretly working with
the adversary to secure incriminating admissions.
"' This conception could explain the suggestion in Massiah that a defendant confronted
surreptitiously by an unknown government agent is "more seriously imposed upon" than a
defendant who is subjected to interrogation by a known officer. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
It could also explain the Kuhlmann majority's description of elicitation by an informant as
"the functional equivalent of interrogation." Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,459 (1986)
(quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 277).
14' There is certainly room for reasonable debate over the correct constitutional conception
of counsel's roles in ensuring fair trials. I have made it clear before that I agree with the broader
conception of counsel and fairness that I perceive in the Fellers decision. See Tomkovicz,
Adversary System, supra note 116, at 39-62. Among the reasons why a more limited under-
standing seems unsatisfactory is that the right involved in Massiah is the same right that exists
at trial. If the pretrial right to assistance is only a safeguard against deception or pressure, it
would seem logical that the trial right to assistance is similarly limited. I am highly skeptical
of that position. It seems to me that whether or not the government was deceptive or brought
pressure to bear, it would deprive an accused of his Sixth Amendment entitlement were it to
confront him at trial in the absence of counsel in order to further the effort to convict. If the
values that call for counsel's aid at trial are threatened without deception or pressure, the same
would seem true at pretrial confrontations.
' The reasoning of Ash may well reinforce the view that nondeceptive, noncoercive efforts
to engage or take advantage of an unequal accused in the absence of counsel are inconsistent
with the notions of fair play that underlie the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Ash, 413
U.S. 300 (1973). In Ash, the Court rejected the claim of entitlement to counsel at a pretrial
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to validate the view that a fair adversarial trial in our constitutional system is one in
which the state refrains from active interaction with an unassisted accused in ways that
could redound to the accused's detriment. This vision of fair play in the adversary
system and of the roles of counsel in ensuring fair trials explains why an accused is
entitled to protection against both conversations with undercover government operatives
and noncoercive remarks by known officers.'49 It explains why Mr. Fellers was entitled
to a lawyer when known officers merely approached him after indictment, said that
they wanted to discuss his involvement in drug distribution and his association with
co-conspirators, and discussed those matters with him.
C. The Practical Consequences of the Fellers Ruling: The Meaning and Scope of
Deliberate Elicitation
As already noted, the Court has never defined "deliberate elicitation"-the core
doctrinal component of Massiah that dictated the outcome of Fellers.50 This failure
stands in marked contrast to the Court's efforts to specify the meaning of "interroga-
tion"-the parallel Miranda element involved in Fellers.5' The object here is to
photo array. Id. at 317-18. The Court, however, reaffirmed the entitlement to counsel at a
corporeal lineup involving the physical presence of the accused because counsel could assist
the accused at such a lineup, furnishing the expertise that a layperson lacks and combating the
prosecution's efforts to take advantage of the accused. Id. at 314. Lineups involve no deception
or coercion, but they do provide opportunities for the state to interact with the defendant and
secure evidence that can harm his chances for acquittal at trial. Id. The Ash majority denied
that the risks of erroneous conviction resulting from improper suggestion were the reasons
for granting a right to counsel at a lineup, emphasizing that a lineup is a critical stage trigger-
ing the right to counsel because it constitutes a "trial-like confrontation" between the govern-
ment and the accused. Id.
" The decision not to require either deception or coercion as a predicate for the right to
counsel seems consistent with the absence of any specific indications in the Massiah precedents
involving undercover agents that deceit was somehow essential to the recognition of a right
to counsel. Although deception has always been present in the undercover agent cases, the
emphasis has always been on "deliberate elicitation" of incriminating remarks in the absence
of counsel or a waiver. If an undercover informant who was merely a cellmate or codefendant,
for example, were to end the deception by revealing that he had been recruited by the state to
secure information from the accused, it seems clear that an accused would still have an entitle-
ment to counsel's assistance against deliberate elicitation by that informant.
Moreover, the entitlement to counsel recognized by Massiah surely would not be honored
by surreptitious elicitation in the presence of counsel. The right recognized in Massiah must
include an entitlement to be made aware that one is dealing with one's adversary.
50 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
'1 Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (enhancing understanding of the concept by
holding that interrogation requires a known government actor); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291,298-99 (1980) (providing a definition of "interrogation" and a relatively thorough
explanation of some of the details of that definition).
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suggest a definition that gives content to the controlling Sixth Amendment criterion
and highlights its differences from the government conduct needed for Miranda's
Fifth Amendment protection. 1
2
I start with the ordinary meaning of the words "deliberate elicitation." To elicit is
"to call forth or draw out."' 53 Thus, the government engages in "elicitation" when it
calls forth admissions from an accused or draws disclosures out of his mind. The ad-
jective "deliberate" suggests a need for "intent" and is synonymous with "voluntary."'" 4
An alternative, potentially appropriate definition of deliberate is "characterized by...
awareness of... consequences."'55 Consequently, elicitation could be deliberate
when it is intentional or voluntary or when the elicitor is aware of the consequences
of the conduct.
Multiple ambiguities lurk beneath the surface of these elementary definitions.
One question is whether active elicitation is required. It is conceivable that one might
passively and silently call forth or draw revelations from an accused. '56 The Court has
rejected this position, however, holding that only active elicitation can give rise to
a critical stage that necessitates counsel's assistance. 57 According to the majority
in Kuhlmann v. Wilson,'58 "the defendant" who claims an entitlement to counsel
"must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond
merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks."' 59
By word, deed, or some combination of the two, state agents must call forth or draw
out the accused's revelations.
Another significant question is whether the agent who elicits must merely engage
in intentional or voluntary conduct that does, in fact, yield disclosures. Instead, an
elicitor might have to intend to elicit-i.e., to produce results-by his or her con-
duct. Alternatively, an "awareness" that elicitation of statements will (or might) be the
"consequence" of his or her actions could be sufficient. The Court's position regarding
152 One clear difference is that only known state agents can interrogate-i.e., that even
express questioning by an undercover operative does not qualify and trigger Miranda's Fifth
Amendment scheme. See Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296. Moreover, Fellers makes it evident that
conduct by known officers that is insufficiently evocative to qualify as interrogation may well
constitute deliberate elicitation. See Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524 (2004).
153 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 736 (3d ed. 1993).
114 Id. at 596.
' Id. Other meanings that suggest a need for "careful thorough calculation and con-
sideration" or a "slow, unhurried" decision-making process seem unnecessarily demanding
in this context. Id. There is no apparent reason why an official's quickly-conceived and
quickly-executed effort to secure inculpatory admissions should be beyond the Sixth
Amendment's reach.
156 The mere presence of another's ear, an apparent willingness to listen, or even an un-
willingness to respond might prompt a particular defendant to make disclosures.
157 Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
158 Id.
"9 Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
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the mental state of the individual who elicits is murky. In his dissent in United States
v. Henry, "°Justice Blackmun argued that elicitation should be "deliberate" only when
a government actor has an "intent" to secure admissions-i.e., that obtaining dis-
closures must be the object of the conduct. 16' He accused the majority of eliminating
the intent demand and effectively replacing it with a negligence standard. 62 The
majority ignored that charge and did endorse a standard that might seem to undercut,
or at least dilute, any "intent to elicit" demand. 163 Moreover, in both Henry and Massiah
the Court found deliberate elicitation merely because some conversations occurred."M
It neither examined the nature of those conversations nor found that the specific
conduct of the informants during those conversations was intended, designed, or known
to be likely to produce the accused's admissions.
On the other hand, the language employed by the majority in Kuhlmann-that the
elicitor's action must be "designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks"-
strongly suggests that intent to elicit is a requisite. 65 Moreover, the doctrinal stan-
dards promulgated in Henry and Moulton do not necessarily undermine an intent to
elicit demand. First, because they were developed to determine whether the govern-
ment is responsible for an undercover operative's active elicitation, those standards do
not directly address the separable question of whether the individual who actively
elicits must have an intent to do so. Second, Moulton indicates that those standards
are not satisfied by negligence;"6 rather, the government must at least "know" that its
undercover operative is likely to elicit. 67 Thus, those decisions could be consistent
'60 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
161 See id. at 278 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 279 ("The Court's extension of Massiah would cover even a 'negligent' triggering
of events resulting in ... disclosures. This approach. . . is unsupported and unwise.").
163 The Henry majority found a Sixth Amendment deprivation because the govemment had
"intentionally creat[ed] a situation likely to induce [the defendant] to make incriminating
statements." Id. at 274. Moreover, the Court asserted that "[e]ven if' the FBI agent "did not
intend that [his informant] would take affirmative steps to secure incriminating information
... he must have known that" such a result was "likely." Id. at 271. This language plausibly
could be read to undermine, even eliminate, a demand for an "intent to elicit."
"6 Id. at 270; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
165 Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986) (emphasis added).
"6 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985) (indicating that the Sixth Amendment is
not violated when the government obtains statements "by luck or happenstance," but only when
it intentionally creates or knowingly exploits "an opportunity to confront the accused without
counsel being present").
167 The Moulton Court held, "that when the State obtains incriminating statements by
knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation
between the accused and a state agent," it deprives the accused of his Sixth Amendment
entitlement. Id. at 176. The Court then made it clear that the "must have known" language
employed by the Henry majority was not intended to suggest that negligence is sufficient. See
supra note 163; Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176. Instead, because "[d]irect proof of the State's
knowledge will seldom be available," the accused can carry his burden by demonstrating
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with a broad definition of "deliberate" which encompasses both a purpose to elicit
and an awareness that elicitation is a likely consequence. Furthermore, the Court's
failure to examine the conversations in Massiah and Henry could simply reflect an
implicit conclusion that the prior arrangements between the undercover operative and
the government provided ample evidence that any conversations by the informant
with the accused were designed to produce results.
Although there is ample room for debate, it seems fair to say that the Court
probably contemplates an intent-to-elicit requirement, but defines intent broadly to
include either a purpose to produce or knowledge that actions are likely to produce
admissions. Moreover, the determination of whether purpose or knowledge existed
does not call for an exploration of the actual subjective state of mind of the eliciting
agent. Instead, that state of mind is determined objectively by asking whether the
actions of the elicitor evince an intent to or an awareness that he would (or was likely
to) elicit admissions.
Whether the deliberate-elicitation standard requires that conduct be sufficiently
"likely" to succeed in drawing admissions from an accused is also uncertain. The
holding in Henry could be read to incorporate a "likelihood" of success requirement. 6
As mentioned above, the "likely-to-induce" standard announced in that opinion was
designed to determine whether government agents who have enlisted undercover agents
should be held responsible for active elicitation by those agents, not to decide whether
the agents have engaged in conduct that triggers the right to counsel. 69 Still, it seems
unlikely that the government could satisfy that standard unless the eliciting agent's
conduct was itself likely to produce disclosures. On the other hand, language in Henry
may indicate that the relevant question is not whether there was a likelihood of success,
but whether the undercover agent was likely to act to secure information. 70
The results in both Massiah and Henry provide powerful support for the view that
a likelihood of success is not necessary for conduct to qualify as "deliberate elici-
tation."'' In both cases, covert agents deliberately elicited merely by conversing with
the accused. No showing was made, and there was no determination that the agents'
contributions to the conversations made admissions of guilt at all likely. The Court's
"that the State 'must have known' that its agent was likely to obtain incriminating statements
...." Id. at 176 n. 12. Thus, knowledge is required, but, according to Moulton, objective
proof of that subjective mental state is sufficient.
'" Henry, 447 U.S. at 274 (holding that the Sixth Amendment had been transgressed
because the government had "intentionally creat[ed] a situation likely to induce [the accused]
to make incriminating statements" (emphasis added)).
169 See supra notes 116 and 119.
170 See Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 (stating that it is enough if the government agent "must
have known" that his operative "would take affirmative steps to secure incriminating
information" (emphasis added)). But see Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176 n. 12 (asserting that proof
that the government "'must have known' that its agent was likely to obtain incriminating
statements from the accused in the absence of counsel suffices" (emphasis added)).
171 See Henry, 447 U.S. 264; Massiah v. United States, 277 U.S. 201 (1964).
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conclusion in Fellers itself provides further support. Justice O'Connor asserted that
there was "no question" that by informing the defendant that they had the purpose
of discussing his drug distribution and his association with charged co-conspirators
the officers had deliberately elicited information from him.'72 She did not pause to
assess or even advert to the probability that Fellers would inculpate himself.
Furthermore, unless express questions are asked, interrogation occurs only when
officers "should know" that their words or acts are "reasonably likely to elicit an in-
criminating response from the suspect."' 173 In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Court indi-
cated that actions sufficient to trigger right to counsel protection do not necessarily
satisfy this definition of interrogation.174 The Fellers Court held that actions that
apparently did not satisfy Innis' s "reasonably likely to elicit" standard easily cleared
the "deliberate-elicitation" hurdle.'75 At the very least, these two opinions make it clear
that the actions regulated by the Sixth Amendment need not be "reasonably likely"
to produce admissions. Of course, this does not foreclose the possibility that some
lesser likelihood-a reasonable possibility or a nonnegligible risk, for example--could
be required.
Thus, there may be no specific doctrinal demand for a showing of likelihood that
conduct will yield statements. Still, if an intent to elicit or an awareness that elicitation
will (or is likely to) be the consequence of one's actions is required, then assessments
of probable success will, in fact, prove relevant. In making the objective determination
of intent or awareness, the chances that certain conduct will prompt disclosures would
be a significant factor. The more probable that outcome, the more likely it will be found
to have been intended or contemplated by the elicitor. If the likelihood of securing
disclosures was slim or minuscule, a court might well conclude that elicitation was
neither intended nor anticipated.176
172 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524 (2004).
173 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (emphasis added).
114 Id. at 300 n.4 (deeming "erroneous" the "suggestion" that "the definition of 'inter-
rogation' under Miranda is informed by th[e] Court's decision in Brewer v. Williams" be-
cause that "decision... rested solely on the Sixth... Amendment right to counsel," which
"prohibits law enforcement officers from 'deliberately elicit[ing]' incriminating information
from a defendant").
175 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 524. I say "apparently" because while the lower court held that no
interrogation had occurred, the Supreme Court did not address that question. It seems unlikely,
however, that the Court would have disagreed with the lower court if it had considered the
issue. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing why the Court would have been
reluctant to classify officers' actions in Fellers as interrogation).
176 The substantive criminal law recognizes the logic of reliance on the probability of a
particular outcome in deciding whether a defendant possessed the mens rea of "intent" to
cause that outcome. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Maryland, 680 A.2d 512, 515-16 (Md. 1996)
(asserting that intent to kill can be inferred if risk of death from an accused's conduct is high
enough, but because likelihood of death from unprotected sex was low, it could not alone
support inference of intent to kill required for attempted murder).
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In sum, there is very little support for the view that conduct cannot amount to delib-
erate elicitation unless it is likely to produce admissions from an accused. On the other
hand, the probability that actions will result in incriminating responses could be an im-
portant variable in determining whether eliciting actions were sufficiently "deliberate."
The Court did not provide a rationale for its holding in Kuhlmann v. Wilson that
active elicitation is necessary to trigger right-to-counsel protection.'77 That conclusion,
however, can be reconciled with the implicit understanding of the Sixth Amendment's
objectives reflected in Fellers and prior Massiah precedents. The right to counsel is
a generous safeguard that protects defendants against the efforts of their government
adversary to secure convictions. It is arguable that an accused needs equalizing assis-
tance only when the government actively engages him in ways that could disadvantage
his defense. He needs no help to determine whether it is wise to spontaneously volun-
teer incriminating information to inactive associates. The mere presence of the adver-
sary does not take advantage of or exploit his vulnerability or inequality. For that
reason, it is not "unfair" to convict a person based on disclosures passively received.
They are not the product of an imbalanced adversarial "confrontation." In sum, it
is plausible to conclude that active elicitation is required because mere listening by
one's adversary does not threaten the interests and policies that inform and justify
an entitlement to legal assistance.'78
In my view, however, the policies underlying the right to counsel do not dictate
either a requirement that active elicitation must be intentional or knowing or a demand
for some cognizable likelihood of producing results. If the elicitor is, in fact, acting
for the government'79 and engages in conduct that does induce an accused to reveal
177 477 U.S. 436, 456 (1986).
178 The holding in Kuhlmann is not an indisputably correct interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment. In an earlier article, I outlined the arguments that could support extension of
the right to counsel to passive reception of incriminating statements and endorsed that
position. See Tomkovicz, Adversary System, supra note 116, at 79-81. Although I have
not changed my view of the merits, I do acknowledge that the arguments for limiting counsel
to active elicitation situations are credible. It is noteworthy that while the two most liberal
members of the Court, Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented in Kuhlmann, they did not
advocate coverage of passive listening by informants. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 475-76
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the facts showed active deliberate elicitation that
gave rise to a right to counsel).
17' As already noted, Henry and Moulton seem to require more than recruitment or employ-
ment by the government-i.e., they do not hold the state responsible for an undercover agent's
elicitation simply because he is working for the state. See supra note 116. Instead, the facts
must show that the government either "intentionally creat[ed]" or "knowing[ly] exploit[ed]" an
opportunity to confront the accused without counsel. See supra note 116. 1 will not discuss
that requirement at length here, but have discussed and challenged it on a previous occasion.
See Tomkovicz, Adversary System, supra note 116, at 71-77. My view is that if an undercover
agent is, in fact, acting for the state, not for his or her private purposes, that alone should make
the state responsible for any conduct that meets the deliberate elicitation standard. Id. There
should be no need to determine whether the state intended active elicitation or knew that it
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information, there has been an unequal adversarial engagement of the kind the Sixth
Amendment is designed to prevent. There may be superficial appeal in the notion that
the government should not be penalized for unintended, unexpected, accidental, or un-
likely elicitation. Penalization of the state, however, is not the issue. The apposite
inquiry is whether an accused has suffered the sort of harm and the kind of adver-
sarial disadvantage that the Framers meant counsel to guard against. If active engage-
ment with an uncounseled defendant has produced an evidentiary advantage for the
state, the injury to the accused is the same whether or not the elicitor had "fault" and
whether or not the interactions had a cognizable chance of success.
Massiah involved a surreptitious scheme in which a federal agent and the accused's
codefendant set out to induce him to speak about his criminality.' It seems likely
that the Court described the constitutionally regulated conduct as "deliberate elicitation"
because that phrase accurately described the facts of the case. The Justices probably
gave no thought to whether a right to counsel would be appropriate in a case with un-
intended or unexpected elicitation. That issue was not before the Court. Instances
of unintended or unexpected elicitation would seem to be rare and, thus, unlikely to
cross the minds of or concern those who were announcing a novel, pretrial extension
of the Sixth Amendment.'' In my view, it would be preferable to trim the doctrine,
eliminating the word "deliberate" and describing the regulated conduct as "elicitation
by a government agent." This helpful clarification would be consistent with the pur-
poses of recognizing pretrial right to counsel protection. I have no illusions, however,
that the Court will adopt this proposal. I will be more than content if the Justices
reach the same result by refusing to interpret the "deliberate elicitation" criterion in
ways that may seem implicit in the terminology or precedents but are inconsistent
with the spirit of the counsel guarantee.
CONCLUSION
Fellers v. United States is a terse, scarcely noticed opinion that purported to do
nothing more than apply settled doctrine to undisputed facts in order to correct a
patently erroneous legal conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals. The rare show
of unanimity regarding the Massiah doctrine's pretrial extension of the right to trial
counsel only enhances the impression that the decision is inconsequential.182 In my
was likely. Id.
180 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 203-04 (1964).
'8' For this reason, the resolutions of the doctrinal questions discussed in this section are
likely to make little, if any, difference in actual cases. The rarity of elicitation that is unin-
tended, unexpected, or unlikely means that the practical impact of demanding fault or likeli-
hood would probably be insignificant.
182 The unanimity of the Court's decision to purge the more demanding interrogation stan-
dard is actually quite remarkable. Somewhat "moderate" members of the Court-Justices
Lewis Powell and Harry Blackmun-had indicated that in their view interrogation was
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view, however, Fellers is a deceptive opinion that, in fact, addressed and clarified a
virtually unnoticed, yet central, ambiguity of Sixth Amendment law. By announcing
that interrogation is not necessary to trigger Sixth Amendment protection, confirming
that undercover operatives and known officers are subject to the same standard, and
holding that the right to counsel exists whenever any state agent engages in deliberate
elicitation, Fellers made a notable contribution to substantive Sixth Amendment law.
The result of a decision that known officers are free to interact with an accused as long
as they do not interrogate would have been a less generous entitlement to counsel.
More importantly, the Court's decision to eliminate "interrogation" from Sixth
Amendment discussions and to reaffirm the controlling significance of "deliberate
elicitation" in both undercover agent and known officer settings speaks volumes, albeit
silently, about the nature of the conception of counsel that justifies the Massiah
doctrine. It implicitly confirms that the Court has an expansive understanding of the
roles of counsel in sheltering accused persons against government efforts to convict
and a generous view of the character of the "fair trial" guaranteed by our Constitution.
By searching between the lines of the Fellers opinion and listening carefully, one
can hear telling responses to the critiques leveled against the Massiah right during
the forty years since it was first announced.
Fellers clarified the doctrine, but also highlighted the need for further doctrinal
development. The rejection of interrogation and forceful confirmation of the suffi-
ciency of mere deliberate elicitation are a welcome recognition that right-to-counsel
protection reaches well beyond that provided by the guarantee against compulsory
self-incrimination. One can hope that in future cases the Court does not undermine
the promise of Fellers with unjustifiably narrow interpretations of the meaning of
deliberate elicitation.
sometimes needed for Sixth Amendment protection. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
410 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 439 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Powell had
managed to plant a powerful suggestion to that effect in the last pre-Fellers majority opinion
pertinent to the topic. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 457. Most surprising of all is Chief Justice
Rehnquist's decision to join an expansive interpretation of Massiah, a decision whose very
legitimacy he had directly challenged. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 289-90
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Tomkovicz, Against the Tide, supra note 113, at 146-48
(documenting the Chief Justice's "hostility" toward Massiah).
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